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Justice Kennedy’s Sixth Amendment Pragmatism
Stephanos Bibas*
I. INTRODUCTION
In three separate areas of criminal procedure—sentence enhancements, the
admissibility of hearsay, and the regulation of defense counsel’s
responsibilities—the Supreme Court has recognized major new pro-defendant
doctrines in the new millennium. In each area, the Court has grounded its new
doctrine in a different clause of the Sixth Amendment. And in each, Justice
Scalia has forcefully advocated an originalist, formalist approach.
In contrast, Justice Kennedy has been a notable voice of pragmatism in these
debates, focusing not on bygone analogies to the eighteenth century but on a
hard-headed appreciation of the twenty-first. He has opposed the Court’s radical
1
overhaul of the Jury Trial Clause in the Apprendi/Blakely line of cases. He
joined the Court’s new approach to the Confrontation Clause in Crawford v.
2
3
Washington, but has increasingly sought to rein in extensions of that approach.
And he has largely supported broader readings of the Assistance of Counsel
Clause in defining defense counsel’s duties to investigate and advise on collateral
4
consequences and plea bargaining. In each of these areas, Justice Kennedy has
shown sensitivity to criminal practice today, prevailing professional norms, and
practical constraints, as befits a Justice who came to the bench with many years
of private-practice experience. While Justice Kennedy frequently votes with
Justice Scalia in many other areas of criminal procedure, in interpreting the Sixth
Amendment, his practical approach aligns him more closely with Justices Alito,
Sotomayor, and especially Breyer. His touchstone is not a bright-line rule derived
from history, but a flexible approach that is workable today. Notwithstanding the
5
press’s assumptions about him as a swing Justice, his approach is remarkably
consistent and principled.

* Professor of Law and Criminology and Director, Supreme Court Clinic, University of Pennsylvania
Law School. I was a law clerk to Justice Kennedy during the October Term 1997. Thanks to Shyam Balganesh
and Rick Bierschbach for feedback on an earlier draft, and to the McGeorge Law Review for organizing and
hosting a wonderful symposium.
1. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 326–28 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 523–54 (2000) (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Kennedy & Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting).
2. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3. See, e.g., Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(explaining Crawford’s rationale); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 312 (2009).
4. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
5. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Facing Weighty Ruling and New Dynamic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30,
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This symposium Article unfolds in four parts, each of which explores one
important theme of Justice Kennedy’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Part II
explores the role that history plays in his opinions. Justice Kennedy is a moderate
originalist, looking to history where it works but adapting it to modern realities,
especially to new circumstances and new problems. Part III focuses on his
common-law incrementalism and flexibility, in contrast to some other Justices’
rigid formalism. Part IV explains Justice Kennedy’s structural approach to the
Constitution as fostering dialogue among branches and levels of government. He
emphasizes federalism and checks and balances, not a strict separation of powers.
Part V then underscores the importance of practicality and common sense in
leavening theoretical abstractions. He looks closely at the purposes of laws, their
effects, the lessons of expertise, and the existence of alternative solutions. This
Article concludes that, in interpreting the Sixth Amendment, Justice Kennedy is
fundamentally a practical lawyer, applying the humble wisdom born of
experience rather than the rigid extremes that flow from a quest for theoretical
purity.
II. JUDICIOUS USE OF HISTORY
Justice Kennedy understands that history is a useful tool but not an
omnipotent one. His Sixth Amendment jurisprudence is one of moderate
originalism where it works. He looks to history as a practical lawyer, valuing it as
a guide to the contours and limits of a given principle. He credits history most
where its lessons still carry weight today. His measured approach to the
Confrontation Clause bespeaks his concerns for both history and practicality. But
often there is no relevant history, and Justice Kennedy rightly resists extending
historical rules far beyond their historical foundations. Finally, Justice Kennedy
repeatedly acknowledges and grapples with new problems, instead of
hypothesizing faux-historical answers to them. History, he sees, does not provide
neat, prepackaged answers to all modern questions.
A. Moderate Originalism
Justice Kennedy respects the historical backdrop against which the Framers
drafted and the United States adopted the Sixth Amendment. He joined Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion in Crawford, which swept away a muddled balancing
6
test for Confrontation Clause violations. The primary pillar of Crawford’s
7
reasoning was historical. The Sixth Amendment grew out of a reaction to the
trial of Sir Walter Raleigh and the Crown’s substitution of ex parte interrogations

2012, at A1.
6. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60–69 (overruling in relevant part Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980),
which had authorized admission of out-of-court statements by unavailable declarants where the statements “fall
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bear “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness”).
7. See id. at 43–56.
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for live testimony and cross-examination. Trials at common law, unlike
Continental civil-law systems, depended on live confrontation in open court, so
9
that the jury could decide the witness’s credibility for itself.
This historical account rests on a powerful functional insight: when judges
admit the fruit of out-of-court interrogations, they substitute their own judgments
10
of reliability for those of the jury. Crawford also works as a best-evidence rule,
preventing the government from engineering abusive interrogations to substitute
11
for live testimony and cross-examination. And, as the majority opinion stressed,
the “malleable [reliability] standard” had become “unpredictable [and]
12
amorphous, if not entirely subjective.” It produced inconsistent and
contradictory outcomes and so offered little safeguard against clear violations of
13
the Confrontation Clause. Given the inconsistency, the older balancing-test
14
approach merited little deference under stare decisis and required an overhaul.
Thus, originalist and practical considerations dovetailed in Crawford, illustrating
how originalism can lead to consistent, practical results.
B. The Absence of Relevant History
Faithfulness to history, however, requires appreciating the practical
differences between the present and the past. Justice Kennedy dissented from
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion extending Crawford to govern laboratory
15
analysts’ reports. In doing so, Justice Kennedy highlighted that the Court was
not interpreting the historical Confrontation Clause, but “expand[ing]” it by
16
applying it to laboratory analysts. He understands that past historical episodes
cannot be stretched to answer every present problem.
Fidelity to history also requires acknowledging history’s limits. There may
be no history relevant to a particular issue, or there may be competing historical
analogues. Justice Kennedy sees that lab reports are a new, twentieth-century
phenomenon. If there were any historical analogue, he argued, it was a document
custodian’s authentication of a copy, which historically was admissible without
17
live testimony. He has also noted that laboratory tests and reports in no way

8. Id.
9. Id. at 43.
10. See id. at 56 (“[Historical sources] suggest that [cross-examination] was dispositive, and not merely
one of several ways to establish reliability.”).
11. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining
Crawford’s rationale).
12. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60, 63.
13. Id. at 63–64.
14. Id. at 68.
15. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 330–63 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 345.
17. Id. at 356–57.
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resemble the systematic, extrajudicial examinations that sent Sir Walter Raleigh
18
19
to his death based on “unreliable, untested statements.”
History’s limitations similarly hold true in the Apprendi line of cases, which
extended the Jury Trial Clause to guarantee that juries find facts that raise
20
maximum sentences. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy limited Apprendi’s
21
rule to facts that raise maximum, not minimum, sentences. A key link in his
reasoning was that while facts that raised maximum sentences were historically
viewed as elements to be found by juries, there was no such historical practice
22
for facts that triggered minimum sentences.
C. Acknowledging New Problems
Finally, Justice Kennedy candidly recognizes new problems that one cannot
resolve by mechanically applying originalism. The drafters of the Confrontation
Clause could not have foreseen the new challenges posed by lab analysts’
23
reports, as Justice Kennedy twice stressed in dissent. In sharp contrast, Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion analogized laboratory reports to the accusations
introduced against Sir Walter Raleigh, brushing aside Justice Kennedy’s
24
distinctions between historical fact witnesses and scientific expert witnesses.
The drafters of the Jury Trial Clause, who knew nothing of modern
sentencing hearings, could not have addressed mandatory minimum sentences or
structured sentencing guidelines, as Justice Kennedy suggested in his Harris
25
majority opinion and Blakely dissent. In contrast, Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion in Blakely cited “the control that the Framers intended” juries to have
over sentencing without acknowledging the novelty of sentencing hearings and
26
guidelines.
Most strikingly, the drafters of the Assistance of Counsel Clause lived in a
world without plea bargains. They could not have foreseen that public
prosecutors and defense counsel would come to dominate the criminal process

18. Id. at 344–47.
19. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
20. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000).
21. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568–69 (2002). Apprendi’s historical assertions were
themselves on shaky historical ground, as Justice Kennedy noted in joining Justice O’Connor’s dissent. See
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 525–29 (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Kennedy & Breyer, JJ., dissenting);
Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J.
1097, 1123–32 (2001) [hereafter Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding]; Jonathan Mitchell, Apprendi’s Domain, 2006
SUP. CT. REV. 297, 330–42 (2006).
22. Harris, 536 U.S. at 560–61.
23. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 345–47 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2726–27
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
24. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 315–17.
25. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 323 (2004) (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
Kennedy & Breyer, JJ., dissenting); id. at 328 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Harris, 536 U.S. at 560–61.
26. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306.

214

08_BIBAS_VER_1_6-13-12_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

1/9/2013 10:58 AM

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44
27

and dispose of ninety-five percent of criminal cases through plea bargaining. In
response, Justice Scalia lamented plea bargaining as a “necessary evil” and
would have confined defense counsel’s responsibility to criminal trials and
28
sentences. Justice Kennedy, in stark contrast, recognized the right to effective
counsel during plea bargaining precisely because plea bargaining has become the
landscape of modern criminal justice:
The State’s contentions [that the Constitution guarantees only a full and
fair trial] are neither illogical nor without some persuasive force, yet they
do not suffice to overcome a simple reality. Ninety-seven percent of
federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the
result of guilty pleas. The reality is that plea bargains have become so
central to the administration of the criminal justice system that defense
counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities
that must be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the
Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at critical stages.
Because ours “is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of
trials,” it is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a
backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process. “To a large
extent . . . horse trading [between prosecutor and defense counsel]
determines who goes to jail and for how long. That is what plea
bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is
the criminal justice system.” In today’s criminal justice system,
therefore, the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a
29
trial, is almost always the critical point for a defendant.
For the same reason, Justice Kennedy joined Justice Stevens’ majority
opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky, recognizing the right to effective advice about the
30
possible consequence of deportation. Padilla rightly noted that plea bargains
resolve most criminal cases and that defendants need their lawyers’ help to weigh
31
their pros and cons. And, dissenting in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, Justice
Kennedy pointed out that extending Crawford would mean giving defendants a
new plea-bargaining chip that would usually result in lower sentences instead of
32
vigorous cross-examination at trial.

27. See generally STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3–6, 15–20 (2012).
28. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Padilla v. Kentucky,
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1494–96 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion) (alterations in
original) (citations omitted) (quoting Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 and Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
30. 130 S. Ct. at 1486.
31. See id. at 1484–86.
32. 557 U.S. 305, 354–55 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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III. COMMON-LAW INCREMENTALISM AND FLEXIBILITY
A second notable feature of Justice Kennedy’s Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence is his common-law sensibility. That sense is manifest in his respect
for settled practices and precedents. It also appears in his humility and concern
for the disruptive effect of new decisions. And it leads him to favor flexibility
and incrementalism and eschew rigid formalism.
A. Concern for Settled Practice and Precedent
Throughout his Sixth Amendment opinions, Justice Kennedy has repeatedly
adverted to how actors in the criminal justice system in fact do their jobs. His
Confrontation Clause dissents have explored how lab analysts receive and test
various specimens, interpret results, prepare reports, establish chains of custody,
33
and testify by reading their notes. His opinions endorsing sentence
34
enhancements consistently canvas a range of state sentencing practices. And, in
recognizing a right to effective counsel during plea bargaining, he noted that its
contours would be guided by ABA and state performance standards adopted over
35
the past three decades.
Justice Kennedy’s concern likewise extends to settled precedent. Stare
decisis is an important safeguard of tradition and predictability. Thus, Justice
Kennedy has emphasized how the Apprendi line of cases represents a break with
36
practice and precedent. In dissent, he noted that the majority’s hostility to
judicial sentence enhancements was at odds with the Court’s earlier decisions
37
upholding judicial consideration of recidivism and judicial capital sentencing.
And, writing for the Court, he limited Apprendi’s reach by reaffirming the
Court’s precedent authorizing judges to find facts that trigger minimum
38
sentences. Justice Kennedy’s respect for precedent has led him to acquiesce in
39
precedent with which he originally disagreed. Thus, as just noted, in dissent he
feared that an expansive reading of the Sixth Amendment would imperil judicial

33. Id. at 330–47; Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2723–27 (2011).
34. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 295–97 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (addressing
California’s distinction between offense-based and offender-based sentence enhancements); Harris v. United
States, 536 U.S. 545, 559–60, 567–68 (2002) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion) (canvassing federal and state
statutes authorizing mandatory minimum sentences triggered by various sentencing factors and the absence of
any settled practice to the contrary); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 257 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(noting that “common [state] practice discloses widespread reliance on victim-impact factors for sentencing
purposes”); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 326–28 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
35. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
36. See, e.g., Jones, 526 U.S. at 270–72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
37. See id. (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 246 (1998) and Walton v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002)).
38. Harris, 536 U.S. at 556–68 (reaffirming McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87–90 (1986)).
39. Compare Jones, 526 U.S. at 270–72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), with Ring, 536 U.S. at 589 (Ginsburg,
J., majority opinion, joined by Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter & Thomas, JJ.).
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capital sentencing. Nevertheless, once the Court embraced that reading in
Apprendi, he bowed to that precedent, joining the majority’s application of
41
Apprendi to judicial capital sentencing.
Justice Kennedy’s respect for precedent carries over to the Confrontation and
Assistance of Counsel Clauses as well. He has twice emphasized that extending
Crawford to lab analysts would overturn ninety years of contrary precedent from
42
thirty-five states and six federal circuits.
And in opposing the
constitutionalization of what documents a defense lawyer must review before
trial, Justice Kennedy criticized the majority’s approach as “a radical departure
43
from Strickland and its progeny.” His more innovative Sixth Amendment
rulings have come on issues not governed by binding precedent, where he has
addressed new questions about defense counsel’s responsibilities in plea
44
bargaining.
B. Humility and Disruption
In interpreting the various clauses of the Sixth Amendment, Justice Kennedy
has called upon his colleagues to remain humble and aware of their own
limitations. Dissenting in the precursor to Apprendi, he criticized the majority for
needlessly reaching out in a routine statutory-construction case to flag
45
constitutional questions and reopen settled issues. In one of his Confrontation
Clause dissents, he assailed how “confidently” the majority “disregard[ed] a
46
century of jurisprudence.” In another Confrontation Clause dissent, he
underscored the Court’s own institutional limitations. As he put it, “this Court
lacks the experience and day-to-day familiarity with the trial process to suit it
47
well to assume the role of national tribunal for rules of evidence.” That
institutional humility is the flip side of relying on precedents and standards
previously generated by state and federal legislatures, lower courts, and bar
authorities.
Just as he hesitates to overturn precedents and legislation, Justice Kennedy is
48
cautious about intruding upon lawyers’ considered judgments. Courts must
hesitate, he argues, to “restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making

40. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 270–72.
41. Ring, 536 U.S. at 589 (Ginsburg, J., majority opinion, joined by Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter &
Thomas, JJ.) (overruling Walton, 497 U.S. 639, in part).
42. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 330, 349–52 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
43. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 399 (2005) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
44. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion); Lafler v. Cooper, 132
S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., majority opinion).
45. Jones, 526 U.S. at 254, 265–68, 270 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
46. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 330 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
47. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
48. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 400–03 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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49

tactical decisions,” so defense counsel can triage their limited resources. Most
notably, in interpreting effective assistance of counsel, his opinion for the Court
took the Ninth Circuit to task for “accord[ing] scant deference to counsel’s
50
judgment.” “Plea bargains are the result of complex negotiations suffused with
uncertainty, and defense attorneys must make careful strategic choices in
51
balancing opportunities and risks.” Appellate review must guard against
hindsight bias, lack of familiarity with the particular prosecutor and judge, and
52
lack of a trial record. Thus, he reasoned, “judicial caution” is “imperative” and
habeas courts’ role is limited to policing “manifest deficiency” by defense
53
counsel.
Judicial intervention, he stresses, often comes at the high cost of disrupting
54
expectations and finality as well as settled practices. The majority’s expansion
of the Confrontation Clause imposes an “as-yet-undefined set of rules,” leaving
states to “guess what future rules this Court will distill from the sparse
55
constitutional text.” He has also emphasized that a broad reading of Apprendi
would disrupt expectations and cast doubt on settled practices as well as already56
final sentences. “We are left to guess whether [various sentence-enhancement
statutes] might be in jeopardy,” because the precursor to Apprendi “raises more
57
questions than the Court acknowledges.”
C. For Flexibility, Against Rigidity and Formalism
The common-law method calls for flexibility and experimentation. Thus, in
the Apprendi line of cases, Justice Kennedy has strongly favored leaving
legislatures and sentencing commissions the flexibility to experiment with a
58
range of solutions to modern sentencing problems. He favors “[c]ase-by-case
judicial [sentencing] determinations” that legislatures can then distill and codify,
followed by further “incremental judicial interpretation” that embodies common59
law flexibility and caution. And he has opposed adopting any “particular set of
detailed rules” governing defense attorneys’ duty to review particular records, as

49. Id. at 400.
50. Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 740 (2011).
51. Id. at 741.
52. See id. at 741–42.
53. Id. at 741.
54. See id.
55. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 331 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); accord
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
56. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 296 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Harris v. United
States, 536 U.S. 545, 568 (2002) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 254,
271 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
57. Jones, 526 U.S. at 268 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
58. See Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 295–96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296, 326–27 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
59. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 326–27 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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counsel need “independence” and “wide latitude . . . in making tactical
60
decisions.”
The flip side of Justice Kennedy’s support for flexibility is his opposition to
rigidity and formalism. He opposed “a per se rule requiring counsel in every case
to review the records of prior convictions” as a “rigid requirement” and a “radical
61
departure” from precedent. His dissents frequently criticize the majority’s
62
63
“wooden formalism,” its “formalistic and wooden rules,” and its “wooden,
64
unyielding insistence” on extending Apprendi. Formalism is not just wooden,
but iron: “The iron logic of which the Court is so enamored would seem to
65
require in-court testimony from each human link in the chain of custody.” Other
jurists might embrace “iron logic” as an aspiration or compliment, but to Justice
66
Kennedy, it is a cold, inhuman epithet.
Formalism’s basic problem, Justice Kennedy sees, is that it reifies and
freezes rules, heedless of their costs or the underlying values served. Thus, he has
been one of the staunchest opponents of the Apprendi line of cases, which
adopted a formalistic but easy-to-evade rule against letting judges find facts
67
triggering sentence enhancements. As he observed in dissent, “[n]o
constitutional values are served by so formalistic an approach, while its
68
constitutional costs in statutes struck down . . . are real.” One would imagine
that formalism would at least make the law easier to predict. But when
formalistic rules are “divorced from any guidance from history, precedent, or
common sense,” one can only guess how far the Court will take them, so they do
69
not even guarantee predictability.
IV. FOSTERING EXPERIMENTATION AND DIALOGUE
Flexibility and incremental improvements go hand-in-hand with
experimentation and dialogue. As Justice Kennedy understands, a range of legal
actors need freedom to experiment and improve rules over time. Thus, at the
national level, he emphasizes the need for checks and balances, rather than a
strict separation of powers, to foster interbranch dialogue. That same vision
60. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 399–400 (2005) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–89 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. Id. at 399–400; accord id. at 400, 404 (criticizing “a rigid, per se obligation that binds counsel in
every case and finds little support in our precedents” as little different from “a bright-line rule” and a “rigid
requirement[]”).
62. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
63. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 330 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
64. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 295 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
65. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 336 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
66. See id.
67. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 326–28 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 523–54 (2000) (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Kennedy & Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting).
68. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 267 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
69. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 337 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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applies to the states, as federalism allows each state to innovate and serve as a
laboratory of experimentation. Thus, he opposes Sixth Amendment formalism in
large part because it would shut down various branches’ and states’ fruitful
interplay.
A. At the National Level: Checks and Balances
In interpreting the Sixth Amendment, Justice Kennedy insists that judges
must not usurp legislatures’ leading role. In opposing the Apprendi doctrine, he
has stressed that legislatures, not courts, enjoy the constitutional prerogative to
70
define crimes. Courts should not micromanage how legislators do their jobs by,
71
for example, “chastising Congress for failing to use the approved phrasing.”
Legislatures may entrust sentencing judges with finding a wide range of
sentencing factors. Though Apprendi “set[s] the outer limits of a sentence” by
defining a crime’s elements, within the sentencing range “the political system
72
may channel judicial discretion—and rely upon judicial expertise.” Legislators
and voters have relied upon this flexibility, so courts should hesitate to unsettle
73
this practice. Though Justice Kennedy has spoken out against mandatory
74
minimum sentences as “unwise,” he has pointedly declined to write that policy
view into the Constitution. After acknowledging criticisms of mandatory minima,
his opinion for the Court held that the Constitution permits judicial findings to
trigger them, “leav[ing] the other questions to Congress, the States, and the
75
democratic processes.”
Deference to legislatures promotes interbranch dialogue: an ongoing
conversation among legislatures, courts, and other actors. Though he joined the
principal dissent in Blakely, Justice Kennedy also dissented separately to
76
underscore how the majority’s rule thwarted that dialogue. He stressed the
“fundamental principle under our constitutional system that different branches of
77
government ‘converse with each other . . . .’” Quoting Justice Jackson’s
separation-of-powers analysis in the Steel Seizure Case, Justice Kennedy
emphasized that the Constitution structures branches that are interdependent, not
78
just insulated. Legislatures and judges should constantly cooperate, as
legislatures codify patterns of individual adjudications, judges in turn interpret

70. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 270 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 267.
72. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 567 (2002) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
73. Id. at 567–68.
74. Anthony M. Kennedy, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Sup. Ct., Speech at the American Bar Association
Annual Meeting 4 (Aug. 9, 2003) (transcript on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
75. Harris, 536 U.S. at 568–69.
76. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 326–28 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 326 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 408 (1989)).
78. Id. (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring))).
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and refine legislation, and so on. “Sentencing guidelines are a prime example of
80
this collaborative process,” which “is basic constitutional theory in action.”
Collaboration is not only intrinsically valuable as part of the democratic
process, but it also helps the law to grow. As Justice Kennedy put it in his
Blakely dissent, “[t]his recurring dialogue . . . [is] an essential source for the
81
elaboration and the evolution of the law.” Judges, probation officers, and
legislatures must cooperate on an ongoing basis to improve structured
82
sentencing.
One of Justice Kennedy’s key insights is that different actors have different
strengths. As a former litigator, he has great respect for jury service. Thus, in a
jury-selection case, he objected that race-based peremptory challenges violate
83
jurors’ right to serve and participate in administering the law. But jurors’ shortterm service is both a strength and a weakness. Because individual jurors serve
for only short periods, they lack the breadth, expertise, commitment, and ability
84
to develop standards over time. Other criminal justice actors compensate for
those deficiencies. Judges, probation officers, and prison officials have the broad,
long-term, professional outlook needed to develop sentencing standards. These
professionals must work together, engaging in ongoing conversations about
85
sentencing reform under the direction and oversight of legislatures. Legislatures
should remain free to draw upon both their own “collective wisdom” and judicial
expertise while simultaneously channeling and limiting judicial discretion,
86
instead of having to delegate everything or nothing to judges. A rope is much
stronger when it comprises many different strands; none of the rope’s strands
runs the whole length, but each contributes a distinctive strength to the whole.
B. In the States: Federalism and Experimentation
The same logic calls for even greater deference to state criminal-justice
practices. Invoking Justice Brandeis’s famous metaphor, Justice Kennedy
explained that states have an interest in “serv[ing] as laboratories for innovation
87
and experiment.” By stark contrast, the Court in Blakely destroyed democratic
legislatures’ reforms, rejecting “the accumulated wisdom and experience of the

79. Id. at 326–27.
80. Id. at 327.
81. Id.
82. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 295–97 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
83. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406–10 (1991).
84. See Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 295–97 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
85. See id.
86. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 327 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Harris v. United
States, 536 U.S. 545, 559, 567 (2002) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
87. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 327 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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Judicial Branch,” and ordered states to discard the ideas, experience, and reforms
88
they had carefully developed.
Deference to states also undergirds Justice Kennedy’s Confrontation Clause
dissents. He objected that “[t]he Court dictates to the States, as a matter of
constitutional law, an as-yet-undefined set of rules” without offering much
89
guidance, leaving states to guess what future mandates lie in store. States need
flexibility to develop the rules of evidence as they assess new scientific tests and
pressing problems such as statements by battered women who are later killed by
90
their abusers. Yet the Court’s Sixth Amendment formalism has frozen in place
91
the rigid, primitive slogans of colonial hearsay law, hobbling state reforms.
In contrast, when states have already converged on a particular solution,
Justice Kennedy is more comfortable drawing upon it as the fruit of collective
experience. Thus, in recognizing a right to effective counsel during plea
bargaining, he specifically noted that state and federal bar associations and courts
92
had already specified defense attorneys’ plea-bargaining obligations. Likewise,
Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion in Padilla, which emphasized “[t]he
weight of prevailing professional norms,” both federal and state, that require
93
defense lawyers to warn non-citizens of the risk of deportation.
V. PRACTICALITY AND COMMON SENSE
As befits a practical lawyer’s approach, Justice Kennedy’s Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence is not abstract and rigid, but rather practical and common-sensical.
He frequently adverts to the point or purpose of a particular law or clause,
94
declining to extend meaningless formalism for formalism’s sake. He also defers
to the reasonable professional judgments and expertise of judges, legislatures,
95
and other sentencing professionals—not just juries. He is sensitive to the limited
time, money, and resources that require these professionals to perform triage and
96
make delicate tactical tradeoffs. He cares a great deal about the practical effects
of various rulings, especially those that confer windfalls or impose pointless

88. Id. (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 331 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
90. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2725, 2727 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 2727 (citing David A. Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 S. CT. REV. 1, 5–6, 36).
92. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
93. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010).
94. See, e.g., Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2726 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing the purpose of the
Confrontation Clause).
95. See, e.g., Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 741–43 (2011) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion) (showing
deference to attorneys weighing the pros and cons of plea bargains).
96. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 403 (2005) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (rejecting a
requirement that defense attorneys read each document in connection with a defendant’s prior convictions).
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costs. Finally, he repeatedly discusses alternative remedies to minimize the
98
costs and disruption caused by new rulings.
A. The Relevance of Purpose
Justice Kennedy’s touchstone is the purpose served by a particular clause.
His Confrontation Clause dissents have repeatedly sought to limit Crawford to
cases where the government is effectively substituting out-of-court interrogation
99
for in-court confrontation. Confrontation of fact witnesses serves both to
impress upon them the gravity of their testimony and to limit the influence of ex
parte government interrogations. In open court, witnesses may refine or recant
their accounts, and they are free of the one-sided pressures of the interrogation
100
room. But “[i]t is difficult to perceive how the Court’s holding [applying
Crawford to lab analysts’ reports] will advance the purposes of the Confrontation
101
Clause.” As a practical matter, lab analysts differ from fact witnesses in
multiple ways. They report near-contemporaneous observations of tests, observe
neither the defendant nor the crime, and respond to scientific protocols rather
102
than interrogation. Challenges to their testimony usually turn not on credibility,
perception, or bias, but on methodology and chain of custody, facts that can
easily be challenged in other ways. “The Confrontation Clause is simply not
needed for these matters. Where, as here, the defendant does not even dispute the
103
accuracy of the analyst’s work, confrontation adds nothing.”
Justice Kennedy’s focus on purpose extends to guaranteeing effective
counsel as well. In dissent, he opposed a bright-line requirement that defense
104
lawyers review the entire case file of all prior convictions. Investigation is
good, but it is a means to an end: “[E]ach new requirement risks distracting
attorneys from the real objective of providing vigorous advocacy as dictated by
105
the facts and circumstances in the particular case.” Defense attorneys must
exercise independent tactical judgment in pursuing that goal in a variety of ways,
106
particularly given their limited time and resources.

97. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 355 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(worrying that the majority’s holding will create a bargaining opportunity for defendants).
98. See, e.g., Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2726–27 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (suggesting an alternative to
the majority rule).
99. Id. at 2726.
100. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 338–39 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 343–47.
103. Id. at 340.
104. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 396 (2005) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 402.
106. Id. at 400–01, 403.
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B. Deference to Professional Judgment and Expertise
In that vein, Justice Kennedy understands that professionals need wide but
not limitless latitude. Thus, dissenting from the requirement that defense lawyers
review all case files, he emphasized that defense counsel make “sound strategic
calculation[s]” to forego certain investigations and lines of argument in lieu of
107
others. The Constitution does not guarantee a scorched-earth defense that
leaves no stone unturned. Indeed, state ethical rules may require defense lawyers
108
to conduct such triage. He has likewise emphasized that competent lawyers
must delicately weigh the risks of striking a plea bargain versus proceeding to
109
trial, and courts must not second-guess their judgments in hindsight. That is
particularly true because a defense attorney is a repeat player who may have a
sense of how particular prosecutors and trial courts are likely to respond, and
habeas courts have a very limited role in policing only “manifest deficiency in
110
light of information then available to counsel.”
When defense lawyers’ performance falls outside that wide latitude,
however, reviewing courts must enforce the most basic professional standards of
criminal practice. Defense attorneys must, for instance, meet the minimal
111
standard of communicating formal plea offers from prosecutors to their clients.
Federal and state bar authorities and courts have adopted that standard over the
past three decades, and it is not too much to expect lawyers to live up to that
112
basic obligation.
The same respect for expertise informs Justice Kennedy’s deference to
sentencing reforms. He has repeatedly advocated leaving plenty of room for
legislatures, judges, and other policymakers to develop and refine sentencing
rules in light of evolving experience. Sentencing guidelines exemplify
interbranch collaboration, in which legislatures draw upon the “accumulated
wisdom and experience of the Judicial Branch . . . on a matter uniquely within
113
the ken of judges.” “Judges and sentencing officials have a broad view and
long-term commitment to correctional systems” and should be encouraged to
keep refining sentencing systems under legislative guidance, instead of leaving
114
everything to juries. He lamented that the Apprendi line of cases appeared to
115
have been driven by “a faintly disguised distrust of judges.”
Respect for professional expertise also informs Justice Kennedy’s
Confrontation Clause dissents. In opposing the extension of Crawford to

107. Id. at 401.
108. See id. at 404.
109. See Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 741–43 (2011) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
110. Id. at 741.
111. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
112. See id.
113. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 327 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Mistretta v.
United States, 484 U.S. 361, 412 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 295–96 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
115. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 327 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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laboratory analysts’ reports, he stressed the “scientific and professional norms
and oversight” to which analysts are subject, which differentiate their testimony
116
and the means of challenging it from that of fact witnesses.
C. Limited Time and Resources
Another practical constraint that Justice Kennedy acknowledges is that time
and money are limited. Defense attorneys are overburdened and must carefully
husband their limited time and attention for the most meritorious issues. Thus, he
rejected the notion that defense lawyers must read every document in the case
file of every prior conviction, for such a requirement would siphon resources
117
away from other important tasks.
Resource constraints likewise counsel against extending the Confrontation
Clause to scientific reports. Trial courts are slow and overburdened, and analysts
must now fly around the state or country, waiting for hours or days before
testifying in hundreds of cases each year, even though many defendants plead out
118
at the last minute.
D. Practical Effects
Moreover, Justice Kennedy is acutely sensitive to rulings that will do little
good or cause harm. The Court’s Confrontation Clause rulings, he has charged,
119
are “formalistic and pointless,” as they require lab analysts to testify even
120
though they will simply “read aloud notes made months ago.” Similarly, he has
criticized the Apprendi doctrine as disruptive, formalistic, and devoid of
countervailing practical benefits, because Congress can easily draft around
121
formalistic rules.
Such pointless rulings do little to protect the innocent; instead, they confer
windfalls on the guilty. For example, the Crawford rule may exclude statements
by abused women about the abusers who later murdered them, regardless of the
122
statements’ reliability. The rule may also exclude autopsies conducted by
116. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 345–46 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
117. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 403 (2005) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
118. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 340–42 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 338.
120. Id. at 342.
121. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 294–97 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (worrying
that the “wooden, unyielding” Apprendi doctrine was causing “systemic disruption” and inflicting “collateral,
widespread harm to the criminal justice system and the corrections process”); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296, 326 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (agreeing that the majority did “considerable damage to our laws and
to the administration of the criminal justice system”); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 267 (1999)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (complaining that the majority was apparently “chastising Congress for failing to use
the approved phrasing in expressing its intent . . . . No constitutional values are served by so formalistic an
approach, while its constitutional costs in statutes struck down or, as today, misconstrued, are real.”).
122. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Giles v.
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coroners who died before trial, which effectively creates “a statute of limitations
123
for murder.” In practice, the confrontation right will not expose inaccuracies in
lab analysts’ methodologies and results. Instead, it will become a plea-bargaining
124
chip, which defendants will exchange for more lenient sentences. “Guilty
defendants will go free, on the most technical grounds, . . . adding nothing to the
truth-finding process,” simply because an analyst was sick or unable to make it to
125
court in time.
Justice Kennedy is especially attuned to the practical problems plaguing
twenty-first-century criminal justice. Court dockets are clogged and slow, as
mentioned above. In addition, legislatures and sentencing commissions must
126
work with judges to guide judicial discretion and reduce sentence disparities.
And his opinions have repeatedly depicted plea bargaining as a complex,
uncertain, opaque, yet prevalent process of trading leniency for finality. Judges,
he has noted, must defer to lawyers’ careful, tactical judgments while still
127
policing basic professional norms in plea negotiations. Particularly because
plea bargaining is so prevalent, Justice Kennedy has expressed concern about
128
letting extraneous factors influence bargained-for sentences.
E. Alternative Remedies
Justice Kennedy’s opinions frequently evince his concern that poorly chosen
rules may impede better rules or reforms. Instead of formalistic rules that
preempt further debate, Justice Kennedy has suggested a variety of alternative
remedies that could solve many of the same problems. Rather than requiring the
prosecution to call every lab analyst to the witness stand, defendants could be
free to call them whenever they wished to challenge the accuracy of the analysts’
129
results. Governments could implement other safeguards to regulate laboratory
analysis, such as having independent agencies perform routine tests en masse,
following scientific protocols subject to oversight, issuing result-blind reports,
130
and giving defendants rights to retest evidence for free.
As for plea bargaining, Justice Kennedy’s opinions have regulated the
process while encouraging safeguards to prevent surprise and fabricated claims.
California, 554 U.S. 353, 402–03 (2008)).
123. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 335 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Carolyn Zabrycki, Comment,
Toward a Definition of “Testimonial”: How Autopsy Reports Do Not Embody the Qualities of a Testimonial
Statement, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1093, 1115 (2008)).
124. Id. at 355.
125. Id. at 342–43.
126. See Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 295–96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 327 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
127. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407–08 (2012) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion); Lafler v.
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion); Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 741
(2011) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
128. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 354–55 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
129. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 340–41 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
130. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Courts could require making plea agreements in writing, placing them on the
131
record, and subjecting them to judicial colloquy. Reviewing courts can
experiment with a range of possible remedies and take into account a defendant’s
132
expressed willingness to plead. Finally, Justice Kennedy has suggested limiting
Apprendi to offense facts, leaving judges free to impose enhancements based on
133
offender facts such as recidivism, remorse, cooperation, and criminal history.
VI. CONCLUSION
Journalists and academics sometimes mischaracterize Justice Kennedy as
unprincipled because they fail to discern his consistent underlying approach. At
root, Justice Kennedy is not an ideologue, eager to drive a pure theory over a
cliff. He is a seasoned, practical lawyer, one who respects the wisdom of the
bench, bar, and legislatures, not to mention precedent and settled practices. In
interpreting the Sixth Amendment, Justice Kennedy takes care to conserve the
wisdom immanent in the legal craft while reforming its excesses and outliers.
That humble approach is a welcome counterpoint to other Justices’ abstract Sixth
Amendment formalism. His approach lends stability to the law, counterbalancing
others’ zealous theoretical purity with practicality and common sense.

131. Missouri, 132 S. Ct. at 1408–09 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
132. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
133. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 294–97 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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